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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of indirect exporting, using firm-level data for 27 
countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Indirect exporting depends on a combination of 
fixed and variable trade cost factors. We first hypothesize that firms that perceive customs, 
transportation, crime and legal systems as severe obstacles anticipate higher fixed costs and 
are more likely to export indirectly. The second hypothesis is that indirect exporting tends to 
be a temporary strategy. Econometric models are used to test the first hypothesis and 
transition matrices to test the second. In particular, probit, Heckman-probit and fractional 
response models are estimated to analyse the determinants of the export mode and the share 
of indirect exports. The results indicate that the factors that account for the fixed cost of 
exporting, mainly affect the decision to export indirectly (extensive margin), but some of 
them also affect, to a lesser extent, the amount exported indirectly (intensive margin). More 
specifically, factors such as customs and trade restrictions and transportation obstacles affect 
the extensive margin only, whereas crime affects both margins. Secondly, trade agreement 
membership mainly affects trade in manufactured goods, while exchange rate volatility 
affects positively the extensive and intensive margin of indirect exports of services. The 
results also indicate that firms are more likely to change their status as an indirect exporter 
than they are to change their status as a direct exporter or a non-exporter, which provides 
support to the second hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in the study of the 
internationalization strategies of firms (Bernard et al. 2003; Bernard and Jensen 2004). Three 
main sales modes have been considered in the related literature, namely domestic sales, direct 
exports and exports using an intermediary (indirect exports). A first strand of papers focused 
on studying the determinants of the choice whether to export or not, without taking into 
consideration the choice between direct and indirect exporting. According to the seminal 
paper on that subject by Melitz (2003), firms have to pay a fixed entry cost to access foreign 
markets along with variable trade costs when their product is exported directly. If the fixed 
cost is high and expected sales are low, a firm will likely choose to serve only the domestic 
market. Fixed costs are related to the quality of governance and contracting in a country and 
in turn to the administrative documents needed to export and the time required to obtain the 
necessary documentation. The decision mainly depends on the firm’s productivity level in 
comparison to other firms in the country. Only the most productive firms will choose to 
export, with the less productive firms selling domestically. Trade liberalization will lead to a 
reallocation of firms within industries and to an increase in average productivity. 
As for the choice of whether to export directly or indirectly, theoretical studies that extend the 
model of Melitz (2003) with intermediaries find that for less productive firms, exporting 
using a middleman can be an attractive option. According to Blum et al. (2009), these firms 
choose an intermediation technology that allows them to lower the unit fixed cost of 
exporting, whereas larger firms select a direct distribution technology to access consumers in 
foreign markets. Indirect exporting is assumed to have higher marginal costs, but the 
associated fixed costs are lower or even non-existent (Akerman 2014; Ahn et al. 2011; 
Felbermayr and Jung 2011; Crozet et al. 2013). All these theoretical models predict the same 
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sorting pattern of the different export modes, according to which the least productive firms 
are non-exporters, whereas those with medium productivity levels use intermediaries to sell 
their products abroad and only the most productive firms export directly. The models also 
predict that one of the main factors determining the export mode is the size of the fixed costs 
of exporting. Firms tend to rely more on intermediaries when fixed costs are high or when 
destination markets are small and higher-than-average productivity levels are needed to offset 
lower profits.  
Empirical evidence at the firm level identifies several factors that influence the decision to 
export via a middleman. Specifically, intermediaries reduce search costs for the producing 
firms (Spulber 1999), facilitate matching of sellers and buyers (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
1987) and can act as guarantor of quality (Biglaiser 1993). According to Bernard et al. (2015), 
wholesalers in Italy are smaller than direct exporting manufacturers and export a larger 
variety of products to a smaller number of countries. Like Felbermayr and Jung (2011), they 
emphasize the importance of intermediaries when firms are exporting to destinations with 
weak contracting environments and when exporting homogeneous products. Moreover, 
intermediaries face lower fixed costs of exporting and can therefore easily adjust to changes 
in demand.  Crozet et al. (2013) find that French wholesalers mainly serve countries with 
smaller market size and higher trade costs than the average destination. Abel-Koch (2013), 
using survey data for Turkey, shows that indirect exporters are mostly small firms, producing 
low-quality goods, or introducing an entirely new product to foreign markets, but other 
factors such as foreign ownership or the existence of credit constraints do not influence the 
decision to export indirectly. Also using World Bank survey data, Zerihun (2012) provides 
evidence for firms in sub-Saharan Africa, showing that the decision to export indirectly is 
negatively influenced by firm size, being a subsidiary of a multi-plan firm and having access 
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to information technology. Conversely, it is positively affected by firms' perceptions of 
obstacles in the form of corruption or access to finance. 
A recent study by McCann (2013) that used firm-level data to examine the determinants of 
export behaviour in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, finds that the productivity of indirect 
exporters lies between the productivity levels of direct and non-exporters. His main findings 
are that multiproduct firms, despite being more productive, are more likely to export 
indirectly than single-product firms and that the sunk costs of indirect exporting are 
significantly lower than those associated with direct exporting.  
In the abovementioned studies, little emphasis has been placed on the role of perceived 
uncertainty in the exporting country in the decision to export indirectly. To export directly, a 
firm has to deal with several potential obstacles that can entail additional costs of 
unforeseeable amounts. These obstacles include, among others, domestic and foreign 
bureaucracy and corruption, customs procedures and trade regulations, transportation and 
cross-border financial transactions. Due to the uncertainty relating to these costs, risk-averse 
firms may choose to use a middleman in some markets in order to lower their overall 
exposure to changes in the fixed cost of exporting. Risk-averse firms may also want to test 
demand in a foreign market using an intermediary before paying the fixed costs of entry for 
direct exporting. This is particularly true when fixed costs are high or market potential is low. 
Like Abel-Koch (2013) and McCann (2013), we also use survey data from the World Bank. 
However, we differ from those authors in that we investigate the determinants of the decision 
of whether to export directly or via intermediaries with a special focus on firms' perception of 
uncertainty in the country where they operate1, which mainly affects fixed costs of exporting. 
                                                 
1Unfortunately, the data does not contain information about the destination of exports. We believe that since the 
number of export destinations grows with firm size, controlling for firm size but not being able to control for the 
number of destinations of a firm’s exports may lead us to underestimate the negative relation between firm size 
and indirect exports (Abel-Koch, 2013). 
5 
 
In particular, we take into consideration factors such as transportation hold-ups, crime, weak 
legal systems, trade policy and exchange rate volatility. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to investigate these issues with a wider variety of measures used as proxies for 
perceived obstacles to trade. Most of these measures are proxies for the “perceived” size of 
the fixed cost of exporting and are firm specific (customs and trade regulations, transportation 
hold-ups, crime, weak legal systems). Others are country specific and relate to exchange rate 
volatility and to trade policy, and could be linked to the fixed and the variable costs. In 
addition, we distinguish between trade in goods and trade in services, though we exclude 
retailers and wholesalers from the service sector, as the characteristics of the latter two 
activities are different and could be affected by uncertainty in different ways. As in McCann 
(2013), we focus on Eastern Europe and Central Asia because in these countries political 
instability, corruption and criminality are widespread and act as a barrier to a well-
functioning market economy 2 . Departing from McCann (2013), we consider goods and 
services and our main focus is not multiproduct firms but rather the effect of uncertainty on 
the internationalization strategies of firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia3, since there 
are no papers to date that have examined this issue. 
We assume that poor institutional quality hinders the conditions in which firms (potential 
exporters) have to operate and hence increases uncertainty and transaction costs (De Groot 
and Linders et al, 2004). This uncertainty is a greater threat to potential direct exporters and 
can be avoided by using an intermediary, at least as a “foot in the door” strategy. As proxies 
for fixed export costs, we employ firm-specific measures based on the manager’s perception 
                                                 
2 According to the Doing Business dataset (World Bank) the average time and cost for obtaining, preparing, 
processing, presenting and submitting documents for exports is 30 hours in the region under study compared to 
4.5 hours in high-income OECD countries, and the average cost for documentary compliance is 143 USD, 
whereas in high-income OECD countries it is only 35.6 USD. 
3McCann (2013) is the only previous paper that focuses on Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, his main 
aim is different to ours, as he gives descriptive evidence of the characteristics of indirect exporters, compares the 
likelihood of exporting indirectly for single-product and multi-product firms and focuses exclusively on 
manufacturing firms, excluding the service sector from the analysis. 
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of the extent to which administrative or legal burdens affect a firm’s decision to start 
exporting indirectly. 
The modelling strategy consists of estimating a probit model to investigate the determinants 
of the decision to export indirectly and a fractional regression model to examine the factors 
affecting the intensity of indirect exporting. As robustness checks, we use a narrow definition 
of indirect exporters and also a Heckman-Probit with selection to examine whether the 
decision to export indirectly could be consider independent from the decision to export or not. 
Finally, we also consider a second step fractional regression that estimates the share of 
indirect exports with respect to total exports and includes the inverse Mills ratio from the 
Heckman-Probit model to control for sample selection. 
The main results confirm the hypothesis that indirect exporting tends to be a temporary 
strategy in both the goods and the services sectors. Secondly, concerning the export premia 
the results mainly follow the same hierarchy predicted by the theoretical models, with two 
exceptions. First, in the manufacturing sector, indirect-only exporters are not more productive 
than domestic firms, whereas for services, firms using a mixed exporting strategy (broad 
definition of indirect exporters) have a slightly higher labour productivity than direct 
exporters. The results found for services are new in the literature. Finally, the empirical 
estimations suggest that the decision to export indirectly is positively influenced by the 
perception of customs and trade regulations, transportation and crime as being obstacles to 
exporting. Moreover, larger and more productive firms tend to export a smaller share of their 
exports indirectly. Export intensity is negatively correlated with indirect exporting, whereas 
EU and CEFTA membership favours direct exporting of goods, but not of services. Finally, 
the perception of obstacles stemming from crime also leads to an increased share of indirect 
exports in goods, whereas exchange rate volatility favours indirect exporting and increase the 
share of indirect exporters in the service sector.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical 
approach, section 3 outlines the main results and robustness checks, and section 4 presents 
the conclusions. 
2. Empirical Analysis 
2.1 Data and variables 
We focus specifically on the firm’s perception of obstacles to trading in the source country 
and their influence on the decision of whether to export directly or via an intermediary. In 
order to obtain the variables that are used as determinants of this decision, we combine 
information from the World Bank Enterprise Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) with country-specific information on regional integration and 
exchange rate volatility of the different currencies with respect to the euro and with respect to 
the currencies of the main trading partners4. Data on exchange rates with respect to the euro 
comes from OANDA Corporation. A description of the variables is shown in Table A.1. 
The dataset includes information taken from BEEPS for 27 countries, four years (2002, 2005, 
2007 and 2009) and 18 sectors (See Table A.2 in the Appendix for a list of sectors and 
number of firms by exporting status and Table A.3 for a list of countries and number of firms 
by country and sector).  It can be seen that there are 10385 manufacturing firms and 16509 
services firms. In the manufacturing sector 30 percent of the firms are direct exporters, 
whereas almost 59 percent sell only to the domestic market. The rest, around 10 percent of 
the firms, are indirect exporters, out of which 5.6 percent also export directly. Within the 
service sector, wholesalers and retailers represent around 46 percent of the total, but since 
firms in these industries do not usually produce what they sell and the theoretical distinction 
between direct and indirect exporters is unclear, we exclude these two sectors from the 
                                                 
4 Two alternative exchange rate measures are considered to calculate exchange rate volatility. First, the bilateral 
exchange rate with respect to the USD and second, a nominal effective exchange rate weighted with trade shares 
using 138 destinations of exports (Darvas (2012)). 
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empirical analysis. The remaining industries are construction, hotels and restaurants, 
transport and information technology services. The highest share of indirect exporting firms 
is in the transportation industry, in which around 11 percent of firms export the service 
indirectly (5.2 are indirect exporters and 5.9 percent use a mixed exporting strategy). Direct 
exporting is a less important mode of internationalization for the service sector than for the 
goods sector in general, with only 13 percent of firms using this mode of exporting 
exclusively. Finally, in the service sector around 83 percent of the firms sell their services in 
the domestic market only, indicating the intrinsically non-tradable nature of many services.  
An important issue is to understand how indirect exporting is defined in services, and in 
particular in some of the services categories in which indirect exporting shows the highest 
shares (the transportation, hotels and restaurants and IT sectors). More specifically, we look 
at the descriptions given in the questionnaires concerning the main services exported 
indirectly. These include services from the hotels and restaurants sector (hotel catering supply, 
hotel service, tourist information services, transit and bus rental, and tour packages), from the 
transportation sector (international transport of goods, marine transport, passenger 
transportation and transit of cargo), and from the IT sector (internet services, other computer-
related activities and other software consultancy and supply). 
A number of variables related to transaction costs and uncertainty are selected from the 
surveys, including foreign ownership, perception of the obstacles to a firm’s activities 
presented by transportation, customs and trade regulations, crime, corruption, business 
permits and licences,  the legal system, and time needed to clear customs. The surveys used 
stratified random sampling techniques to select a representative sample for each country 
using industry, firm size and region as levels of stratification.  
We use a broad definition of indirect exports so that this category includes all firms that 
export through an intermediary, as well as those using a mixed exporting strategy with part of 
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their foreign sales exported directly5. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the list of countries 
included in the analysis and the distribution of exporting firms for all sectors across all 
countries. The largest sectors in the sample in terms of number of firms are retail, food, 
wholesale and other manufacturing. Concerning the countries in the sample, Russia, Poland, 
Ukraine and Bulgaria have the largest share of firms in the dataset. Summary statistics of 
firm- and country-specific variables are shown in Table 1. The average share of exports over 
total sales is almost 11.5 percent (Export Intensity), with almost 8 percent on average 
exporting indirectly. About 15 percent of the firms are at least partly foreign owned, and 
while 27 percent are based in a European Union (EU) member country, 42 percent are located 
in a Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) member country.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Indirect exportsijkt 19,218 0.079 0.269 0 1 
Firm-specific variables 
ln N Employeesijkt 19,137 3.466 1.612 0 10.539 
ln Labor Prodijkt 14,909 10.122 1.775 1.565 26.843 
Export intensityijkt 19,149 11.478 25.908 0 100 
Foreignijkt 19,218 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Transportationijkt 18,823 0.737 1.117 0 4 
Customsijkt 17,046 0.919 1.140 0 4 
Crimeijkt 18,513 1.044 1.205 0 4 
Legal systemijkt 17,382 2.501 0.981 1 4 
Customs timeijkt 4,121 3.696 7.379 0 120 
Country-specific variables
EUjt 19,239 0.272 0.445 0 1 
CEFTAjt 19,239 0.425 0.494 0 1 
VolatilityEurojt-1 15,693 0.026 0.050 0 0.470 
Volatility EERjt-1 18,061 0.018 0.023 0.002 0.197 
Note: See Appendix A.1 for a description of the variables. Wholesalers and retailers are excluded from the 
sample. 
 
                                                 
5 This is the definition used by McCann (2013) for indirect exports in the core of his paper.  We also present 
results by using a narrow definition, in this case indirect exporters that also export directly are excluded (see 
results in tables 3, 4 and A.5). 
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In the survey, some firms have been interviewed on a number of separate occasions over the 
years, but when we restrict the dataset to firms that have been interviewed at least twice, the 
sample size is considerably reduced (with 6302 observations left corresponding to 2409 
firms6). By using only those firms in the regression analysis we could be creating a sample 
selection problem, since it is likely that firms that appear several times are better performers 
than those that are only included once. In any case, we are able to track firms that stay in the 
panel and use this reduced sample to test whether indirect exporting is mainly used as a 
temporary strategy to enter foreign markets. Table 2 shows the transition matrix of firms for 
the whole panel (excluding retailers and wholesalers for the abovementioned reasons) and 
also for firms in the manufacturing and the service sectors separately. Export status is 
displayed in the columns and its lag in the rows of the matrix (Table 2). The figures show that 
almost 90 percent of firms that were non-exporters in a given period continued to be non-
exporters in the following period; the figure is considerably higher for firms in the services 
sector (92) than for those in the manufacturing sector (86). The other figures in the first row 
show very low percentages, indicating that non-exporters are very likely to stay as such. 
More mobility is observed in the manufacturing sector, however, with 2.3 percent of firms 
becoming indirect exporters and an additional 2.3 percent moving to a mixed exporting 
strategy using direct and indirect exporting, while 9 percent change to direct exporting. 
Firms that remain indirect-only exporters account for 9.6 percent of the manufacturing sector, 
while no firms in the services sector retain that status in the following observed period. A 
similarly small share is observed for firms moving from a mixed exporting strategy to only 
indirect exporting (8.6 percent in the manufacturing sector). However, in the manufacturing 
sector, a high share of firms, 50 percent, progressed from only indirect exporting to only 
                                                 
6 Although the number of observations is considerably reduced (19218 in the whole sample excluding retailers 
and wholesalers), it allows us to provide some insight into the hypothesis that indirect exports tend to be a 
temporary strategy. 
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direct exporting, and a considerable share (41 percent) changed from a mixed exporting 
strategy to only direct exporting. There was also a marked movement towards direct 
exporting in the services sector but with more firms moving from a mixed exporting strategy 
to direct exporting (52 percent) than from only indirect exporting to direct exporting (35 
percent). Although almost 62 percent of firms in manufacturing (42 in services) remained 
direct exporters, it is worth mentioning that a substantial share of firms using a mixed 
exporting strategy also retained the same status in the following period (37 and almost 24 
percent, respectively, in each sector). 
Table 2. Transition matrix of export status for firms appearing at least twice in the data 
Mode All firms excluding retailers and 
wholesalers 
Manufacturing sector Services without retailers and 
wholesalers 
 Time:  t Mode (%)    Total  
  
Mode (%)  Total Mode (%)  Total
 (t-1) NX IX IDX DX No NX IX IDX DX No NX IX IDX DX No 
NX 89.8 1.8 1.5 6.9 1,446 86.2 2.3 2.3 9.3 527 92.3 1.5 1.0 5.2 842
IX 33.3 6.7 14.7 45.3 75 26.9 9.6 13.5 50.0 52 47.8 0.0 17.4 34.8 23
IDX 14.8 6.2 33.3 45.7 81 12.1 8.6 37.9 41.4 58 23.8 0.0 23.8 52.4 21
DX 28.0 7.1 9.3 55.6 592 19.9 8.7 9.7 61.7 392 43.8 4.6 9.7 42.1 176
Total  68.5 3.6 5.2 22.7 2,194 53.7 5.4 7.7 33.1 1,029 81.9 2.0 3.2 12.9 1,062
Note: NX, IX, IDX and DX denote respectively non-exporters, indirect exporters, firms that export both directly 
and indirectly and direct exporters. 
 
2.2 Performance premia 
In this sub-section we estimate the performance premia for indirect and direct exporters in 
terms of labour productivity and number of employees, in order to provide some insight in 
relation to the sorting pattern that the theory predicts. We should expect that indirect 
exporters enjoy a productivity advantage over domestic firms and that direct exporters are in 
turn more productive than indirect exporters. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows the 
distribution of labour productivity for non-exporters, indirect exporters and direct exporters. 
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Direct exporters appear to have a productivity advantage over indirect exporters7 and the 
latter appear to be more productive than non-exporters. A similar pattern is expected in 
relation to firm size: the theory predicts that direct exporters are bigger in size than indirect 
exporters and the latter are in turn bigger than non-exporters. Tables 3 and 4 present separate 
results for services and manufacturing activities using the natural log of labour productivity 
and employment as dependent variables, respectively. The first three columns use the narrow 
definition of indirect exporters, whereas columns (4) to (6) use the broader definition 
(including firms that export directly as well as indirectly).  
Looking at the results in Table 3, when all firms are included in the first column, the 
estimated coefficients for direct exporters lie above the coefficient for indirect exporters (and 
significantly above those for domestic firms, which is the excluded category), confirming the 
performance hierarchy predicted by the theory. However, in the manufacturing sector, 
indirect exporters (narrow definition, column 2) are not more productive than domestic firms, 
whereas for services, firms using a mixed exporting strategy (broad definition of indirect 
exporters) have a slightly higher labour productivity than direct exporters. 
Table 3. Export mode and labour productivity 
Narrow definition of indirect exporter Broad definition of indirect exporter 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Manu Serv All Manu Serv 
              
Indirect 
exporter 0.112** 0.0461 0.297*** 0.201*** 0.146*** 0.368*** 
[0.0480] [0.0564] [0.0768] [0.0367] [0.0447] [0.0508] 
Direct exporter 0.281*** 0.260*** 0.330*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.349*** 
[0.0240] [0.0298] [0.0407] [0.0256] [0.0324] [0.0421] 
Observations 14,909 8,208 6,701 14,909 8,208 6,701 
R-squared 0.722 0.727 0.719 0.723 0.727 0.720 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets at the country and industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from the regressions. In (4)-(6) indirect exporters also 
include firms that export both indirectly and directly. All regressions include sectoral dummies, and 
country and time dummies. 
                                                 
7 The advantage of direct exporters over indirect exporters is clearer when the narrow definition of indirect 
exporters is used (indirect-only exporters). 
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In terms of employment, results in Table 4 clearly confirm that indirect exporters are 
significantly bigger than non-exporters and indirect exporters are significantly smaller than 
direct exporters, using either of the definitions of indirect exporters and for both 
manufacturing and services activities. 
Table 4. Export mode and firm size 
Narrow definition of indirect exporter Broad definition of indirect exporter 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Manu Serv All Manu Serv 
              
Indirect 
exporter 0.721*** 0.880*** 0.380*** 1.039*** 1.303*** 0.487*** 
[0.0676] [0.0796] [0.108] [0.0590] [0.0554] [0.114] 
Direct exporter 1.105*** 1.315*** 0.641*** 1.214*** 1.490*** 0.667*** 
[0.0443] [0.0405] [0.0714] [0.0475] [0.0403] [0.0733] 
Observations 19,137 10,332 8,805 19,137 10,332 8,805 
R-squared 0.188 0.227 0.139 0.208 0.271 0.141 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets at the country and industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from the regressions. In (4)-(6) indirect exporters also include  
firms that also export directly. All regressions include sectoral dummies, and country and time dummies. 
 
The results concerning manufacturing firms are comparable to those found in McCann 
(2013), whereas the results found for services are new in the literature and mainly follow the 
same hierarchy predicted by the theoretical models. There is however an exception: service 
firms using a mixed strategy, that is exporting both directly and indirectly, are more 
productive than direct-only exporters.  
2.3 Model Specification 
The first part of our econometric approach consists of estimating a probit model with country 
and time-variant industry dummies to explain the probability of exporting indirectly. In a 
second step, we estimate a fractional regression (Oberhofer, H. and Pfaffermayr, 2102; Papke 
and Wooldridge, 1996) using the share of indirect exports over total exports as the dependent 
variable. As a robustness check, we use a two-stage approach  (probit with 
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selection+factional regression) to correct for potential sample selection biases. The 
specification of the probit model used to predict indirect exports is given by: 
 
ܲݎ(ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ݁ݎ௜௝௞௧ = 1) = ߔ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵlnܧ݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁ݏ௜௝௞௧ + ߚଶܮܾܽ݋ݎܲݎ݋݀௜௝௞௧ +
ߚଷܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ݅݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௜௝௞௧ + ߚସܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௝௞௧ + ߚହܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌݋ݎݐܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞௧ + ߚ଺ܥݑݏݐ݋݉ݏ௜௝௞௧ + ߚ଻ܥݎ݅݉݁௜௝௞௧ +
ߚ଼ܮ݈݁݃ܽݏݕݏݐ݁݉௜௝௞௧ߚଽ + ܥݑݏݐ݋݉ݏݐ݅݉݁௜௝௞௧ + ߚଵ଴ܧ ௝ܷ௧ + ߚଵଵܥܧܨܶܣ௝௧ + ߚଵଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝௧ିଵ + ߢ௝ + ߣ௞௧ + ߝ௜௝௞௧)
,            
 (1) 
where IndirectExporterijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm i in country j 
and sector k exports a part of its foreign sales using an intermediary and zero if all exports are 
direct exports. Firm-specific variables include: ln Employeesijkt, which is the natural log of 
the total number of permanent full-time workers; ln LaborProdijkt for the natural log of total 
annual sales divided by the number of workers; Exportintensityijkt, which denotes the share of 
exported sales and it is included to denote the importance of the international exposure of the 
firm as a factor that could influence the mode of exporting; and Foreignijkt, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one when a firm is partly owned by a foreign individual or 
firm and zero otherwise. A firm’s perception of obstacles is captured by three different 
variables: transportation of goods, supplies and inputs (Transportationijkt); customs and trade 
regulation (Customsijkt); and crime, theft and disorder (Crimeijkt), all of which are originally 
measured on a scale from zero to four 8 . The perceived fairness of the legal system 
(Legalsystemijkt) is measured on a scale from one to four, while for time efficiency of customs 
authorities (Customstimeijkt) the number of days needed to clear customs is used. We 
introduce country-specific dummy variables that take the value one if country j is a member 
                                                 
8 We have re-scaled the variable customs, which takes the value of 1 if customs and trade regulations are a 
severe or very severe obstacle for current operations of the firm, 0 otherwise. Another two variables, corruption 
and permits are also used in some models; they are described in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In particular, 
corruption is used in the Heckman-Probit model as exclusion restriction and permit is used in the regressions for 
the service sector. 
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of the European Union (EUjt) or the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTAjt) in 
year t, and a measure of volatility for the nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency 
(Volatilityjt-1). Exchange rate volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first 
difference of the logarithms of the monthly domestic nominal bilateral exchange rate of each 
domestic currency with respect to the euro for the 12 months of the previous year: 
ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝௧ିଵ = Std. dev.ൣln( ௝݁,௠) − ln( ௝݁,௠ିଵ)൧,݉ = 1. . .12. (2) 
where m denotes month and e is the nominal bilateral exchange rate. 
In a next step, we estimate the determinants of a firm’s intensity of indirect exports using a 
fractional regression with two sets of dummy variables (country and sector-time): 
Indirectexports୧୨୩୲ = G(β଴ + βଵlnEmployees୧୨୩୲ + βଶLaborProd୧୨୩୲ + βଷExportintensity୧୨୩୲ +
βସForeign୧୨୩୲ + βହTransportation୧୨୩୲ + β଺Customs୧୨୩୲ + β଻Crime୧୨୩୲ + β଼Legalsystem୧୨୩୲ +
βଽCustomstime୧୨୩୲ + βଵ଴EU୨୲ + βଵଵCEFTA୨୲ + βଵଶVolatility୨୲ିଵ + κ୨ + λ୩୲ + ε୧୨୩୲)
, (3) 
where ܩ(∙) is a know nonlinear function satisfying 0 ≤ ܩ(∙) ≤ 1. The dependent variable is 
the share of indirect exports over total exports for firm i in country j in year t. All other 
variables are identical to the model in (1). Since the dependent variable only varies within the 
interval (0, 1) we use a fractional probit regression, which is more appropriate for this 
response variable. 
The previous two models assume that firms decide whether or not to export before deciding 
about the modality and that both these decisions are made independently of each other. If they 
choose to export, firms then also have to decide the amount to export indirectly. Hence, 
before deciding on the intensity of indirect exporting, firms go through two stages of 
decision-making: first, whether or not to enter the export market, and second, whether to 
export directly or indirectly. An appropriate empirical approach should control for both of 
these decisions before exploring the determinants of the share of indirect exports. At a 
minimum we should test for the independence of the decisions in the modelling framework. 
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In what follow, we explain the modelling strategy, but since we do find that the decisions are 
independent we keep the previous two models as main results. 
Following the approach of Roodman (2001) and Roodman and Murdock (2014)9, we estimate 
a recursive mixed model with selection that allows us to control for sample selection biases 
and to relax the assumption that the error terms in different equations are independent. The 
first bias is caused by ignoring non-exporters. Hence, we estimate a Heckman-Probit model 
in which the decision to export indirectly could be influenced by the decision to export. The 
first step equation of this Heckman is a probit model on the decision to export or not: 
ܲݎ(ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐ݁ݎ௜௝௞௧ = 1) = ߔ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵlnܧ݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁ݏ௜௝௞௧ + ߚଶܮܾܽ݋ݎܲݎ݋݀௜௝௞௧ + ߚଷܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௝௞௧ +
ߚସܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌݋ݎݐܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞௧ + ߚହܥݑݏݐ݋݉ݏ௜௝௞௧ + ߚ଺ܥݎ݅݉݁௜௝௞௧ + ߚ଻ܮ݈݁݃ܽݏݕݏݐ݁݉௜௝௞௧ +
ߚ଼ܧ ௝ܷ௧ + ߚଽܥܧܨܶܣ௝௧ + ߚଵ଴ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝௧ିଵ + ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞௧ + ߢ௝ + ߣ௞௧ + ߝ௜௝௞௧)
. (4) 
In order to fulfil the exclusion restriction in the Heckman-Probit, we use a variable that only 
affects the probability of exporting, but not the probability of indirect exporting. Specifically, 
we use the variable measuring the perception of corruption as an obstacle, which does not 
affect the probability of indirect exports10 . We therefore exclude this variable from the 
estimation in the second stage.  
The main equation is a probit model on the decision to export indirectly or directly as given 
by equation (1) above. Finally, we estimate from the Heckman-Probit the inverse Mills ratio 
and added it as regressor to the fractional regression specified above (Equation 3). 
The second step equation is given by: 
ܫ݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ௜௝௞௧ = ܩ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵlnܧ݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݁ݏ௜௝௞௧ + ߚଶܮܾܽ݋ݎܲݎ݋݀௜௝௞௧ +
ߚଷܨ݋ݎ݁݅݃݊௜௝௞௧ + ߚସܶݎܽ݊ݏ݌݋ݎݐܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞௧ + ߚହܥݎ݅݉݁௜௝௞௧ + ߚ଺ܮ݈݁݃ܽݏݕݏݐ݁݉௜௝௞௧ +
ߚ଻ܧ ௝ܷ௧ + ߚ଼ܥܧܨܶܣ௝௧ + ߚଽܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝௧ିଵ + ܫܯܴ_݅݊݀݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐ + ߢ௝ + ߣ௞௧ + ߝ௜௝௞௧)
. (5) 
In the second step regression, we include the inverse Mill's ratio (IMR_indexport) in the 
                                                 
9 Rodman’s cmp stata command allows for a large class of simultaneous-equation systems, including recursive 
models, in which endogenous variables could influence one another. 
10 Results are available upon request from the authors. 
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model as a correction for sample selection, which address the biases generated by unobserved 
shocks.  
3. Main Results 
Results from the probit estimation denoted in equation (1) are shown in Table 5 in the form of 
marginal effects at mean values of the independent variables. Several estimations including 
different sets of dummy variables and control variables were carried out11 and the preferred 
results include country dummies and interactions between industry and year dummies, with 
the standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. Columns (2) and (3) include two 
alternative measures of exchange rate volatility: first, the volatility calculated as specified in 
equation (2); and second, using a trade-weighted effective exchange rate based on trade with 
138 countries. Finally, column (4) contains the variable measuring time intensity of customs 
procedures, for which there are many missing observations.  
According to our estimates in column (1), the marginal effects of firm size and labour 
productivity are statistically significant at conventional levels only in columns (2) and (3), 
whereas export intensity is significant at the one percent level in all specifications and shows 
a negative coefficient. In particular, column (1) shows that an increase in overall export 
intensity of 10 percentage points decreases the probability of using an intermediary by 0.54 
percent.  
Foreign ownership does not seem to affect the decision to export indirectly. While obstacles 
related to the fairness of the legal system do not show a statistically significant effect, 
customs impediments and trade regulations12, transportation of goods and supply of inputs, as 
                                                 
11 Results using country, year and industry dummies were not substantially different and are available upon 
request. 
12 This variable has been coded as 1 if the customs are a major or very severe obstacle and 0 otherwise. 
Assuming that this is a fixed cost that could affect the decision to export or not and the decision to export 
indirectly or directly, we now consider that when the value is 3 or 4, the fixed costs are an obstacle to export, 
whereas when the answer is 0-3, the obstacle does not impede exporting. 
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well as crime, disorder and theft, significantly increase the probability of exporting indirectly. 
A 1-point increase in the perception of the severity of these obstacles increases the probability 
of indirect exporting by around 1.2 percentage points for transportation and 1.3 percentage 
points for crime, disorder and theft and when customs is a severe obstable the probability 
increases by 5.3 percentage points. An increase in the time needed to clear customs does not 
seem to increase the probability of exporting indirectly, however this could be due to the fact 
that the sample is reduced by 30 percent due to missing data in this variable. Higher exchange 
rate volatility does not seem to promote indirect exporting. Finally, EU membership reduces 
the probability of using an intermediary, but this is not the case with CEFTA membership. 
Linking these results to the theoretical predictions, we find that three of the specific 
components of uncertainty that are related to the fixed cost of exporting, namely, 
transportation; crime, disorder and theft; and customs and trade regulations do increase the 
probability of exporting indirectly, whereas firm size and labour productivity do not 
significantly affect the decision to export indirectly. Concerning membership in integration 
agreements, it appears that uncertainty is clearly reduced for countries that have joined the 
EU, whereas the CEFTA is a more instable and changing agreement, with many of the initial 
members now forming part of the EU. It is possible that EU membership reduces “behind the 
border” trade barriers, facilitating export procedures and thereby lowering the fixed costs of 
exporting. Finally, the uncertainty related to exchange rate volatility could be specific to 
certain sectors. This will be investigated in the next sub-section. 
Table 5. Probit Regression Results  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. variable: Ind. Exports Ind. Exports 
Ind. Ex-
ports Ind. Exports 
Ind. Variables: 
Ln N Employees -0.00534 -0.00610 -0.00525 0.00507 
(0.00647) (0.00638) (0.00631) (0.00634) 
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Ln Labour Productivity -0.00705 -0.0107** -0.0182*** -0.000385 
(0.00578) (0.00532) (0.00706) (0.00368) 
Export Intensity -0.00540*** -0.00532*** 
-
0.00525*** -0.00147*** 
(0.000285) (0.000286) (0.000290) (0.000242) 
Foreign 0.000319 0.00118 -0.00153 -0.0147 
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0136) 
Transport 0.0120** 0.0114** 0.0106** 0.0159*** 
(0.00472) (0.00504) (0.00521) (0.00398) 
Customs 0.0534** 0.0579** 0.0664** 0.0780** 
(0.0267) (0.0294) (0.0289) (0.0354) 
Crime 0.0142** 0.0139** 0.0139** 0.00739 
(0.00630) (0.00635) (0.00651) (0.00695) 
Legal System -0.0121 -0.0131 -0.0110 -0.00646 
(0.00816) (0.00806) (0.00744) (0.00840) 
EU -0.0648* -0.0602** -0.0588* 0.0392* 
(0.0333) (0.0297) (0.0320) (0.0218) 
CEFTA -0.0478 -0.0412 -0.0434 0.000653 
(0.0305) (0.0317) (0.0307) (0.0155) 
Voleuro 0.121 
(0.217) 
Vol EER 0.0287 
(0.459) 
Customs time 0.000739 
(0.000781) 
N 4163 4112 4019 2862 
Pseudo R-sq 0.184 0.183 0.180 0.099 
Notes: Reported values are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables; Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country and industry level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include 
country dummies and industry and year dummies, not reported to save space. The dependent variable is binary 
(0,1) and takes the value of one when a firm exports indirectly (broad definition: indirect exporters only + 
exporters with a mixed exporting strategy) and zero when a firm exports directly only. Retailers and wholesalers 
are excluded from the regressions. 
 
Regression estimates of the model specified in equation (3), with the share of indirect exports 
as the dependent variable, are provided in Table 6. There are two main differences with 
respect to the results in Table 5. Firstly, the estimates for the variables firm size and labour 
productivity are statistically significant in Table 6 (columns 1-3), indicating that a 1-percent 
increase in firm size (labour productivity) is associated with a decrease in the share of 
indirect exports of around 0.3 (0.5) percentage points. Nevertheless, the coefficient of firm 
size is only significant at the ten percent level in models (1) and (2). 
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Table 6.  Fractional Regression Results - Share of Indirect Exports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Reported values are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include country dummies and industry-year 
dummies, not reported to save space. Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from the regressions. 
 
Secondly, only one of the variables representing the fixed cost of exporting, or more 
generally uncertainty, is statistically significant, namely crime, theft and disorder. Legal 
system is also statistically significant in column (4) but only at the ten percent level. Finally, 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable: 
Share of  
Ind. Exports 
Share of  
Ind. Exports 
Share of  
Ind. Exports 
Share of  
Ind. Exports 
 Ind. Variables:         
Ln N Employees -0.00360* -0.00378* -0.00331 0.000509 
(0.00196) (0.00199) (0.00202) (0.00131) 
Ln Labour Productivity -0.00554** -0.00577** -0.00971*** -0.00130 
(0.00231) (0.00235) (0.00263) (0.00177) 
Foreign  0.00362 0.00473 0.00484 0.000827 
(0.00720) (0.00736) (0.00750) (0.00448) 
Export Intensity -0.00444*** -0.00445*** -0.00440*** -0.000988*** 
(0.000163) (0.000163) (0.000162) (8.53e-05) 
Transport 0.0163 0.0156 0.0204 0.0116 
(0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.00952) 
Customs 0.00231 0.00223 0.00175 0.00245 
(0.00256) (0.00261) (0.00263) (0.00159) 
Crime 0.00594** 0.00597** 0.00537** 0.00250 
(0.00257) (0.00262) (0.00265) (0.00172) 
Legal System -0.00436 -0.00456 -0.00443 -0.00381* 
(0.00317) (0.00322) (0.00327) (0.00218) 
EU -0.0347*** -0.0367*** -0.0349*** -0.0116 
(0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.00875) 
CEFTA -0.0173 -0.0133 -0.0146 -0.00941 
(0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.00930) 
Voleuro 0.113 
(0.0812) 
Vol EER 0.165 
(0.180) 
Customs Time 0.000479** 
(0.000223) 
Observations 4,250 4,195 4,104 3,004 
Pseudo R-squared 0.310 0.308 0.306 0.126 
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in column (4), when the time to clear customs is added, the effect significant at the five 
percent level, but the effect is negligible in economic terms. 
3.1 Goods versus Services 
The dataset used in this study covers firms producing goods and others providing services, 
and the two types of firms differ significantly in terms of export procedures. For this reason, 
we present in this section separate estimates for goods and services, which enables us to 
analyse the differences between these two sets of exporters in terms of the impact of 
perceived uncertainty on the decision to export indirectly.  
In order to be able to compare the estimates, we estimate the models (1) and (3) separately for 
goods and services, with the same specifications as in column (2) and (3) in Tables 5 and 
Table 6. Table 7 shows the estimation results for the probit model (1), whereas the results for 
the intensity of indirect exports (model (3)) are shown in Table 8. The tables are divided into 
two parts: the first shows the results for goods and the second for services excluding retailers 
and wholesalers. 
According to the results shown in Table 7, the three variables used as proxies for fixed cost of 
exporting, namely transport, customs and trade regulations and crime, all appear to 
significantly increase the probability of exporting goods indirectly, but this is not the case for 
the service sector. For the latter sector, it is only the variable business permits and licences as 
an obstacle to current operations of the firm that was found to affect the response variable. 
Moreover, foreign ownership encourages indirect exports for services. It is also in the 
services sector that smaller exporters are likely to export more indirectly. Meanwhile, less 
productive firms in the goods sector are likely to export more indirectly.  
Concerning the country-specific variables, the effect of volatility in the exchange rate 
increases the probability of indirect exports for services, but decreases it for goods. With 
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regard to regional integration, EU and CEFTA membership affect the probability of indirect 
exporting mainly in the goods sector, but not in the services sector. 
Table 8 shows in columns (1) and (2) that perception of crime as an obstacle and customs and 
trade regulations have also a significant impact on the share of indirect exports of goods, but 
the magnitude of the effects are halved; whereas transportation as an obstacle is not 
statistically significant in Table 8. EU membership also reduces indirect export intensity for 
goods but not for services (columns (3) and (4) in Table 8). Volatility of the exchange rate is 
not affecting the intensity of indirect exporting in the goods sector. However, it does affect 
the service sector to a lesser extent than in Table 7, where the dependent variable was the 
decision to export indirectly. 
Summarizing, the determinants of the probability of exporting indirectly and the intensity of 
indirect exports differ to some extent for goods and services. On the one hand, a higher 
perception of crime as an obstacle appears to affect positively the decision to export goods 
indirectly but does not affect services. On the other hand, firms are more likely to export 
services indirectly as firm size decreases, when firms are not foreign owned and when 
uncertainty surrounding future revenues due to domestic exchange rate volatility rises. The 
first outcome seems intuitive when considering crime in the form of physical theft of goods, 
while the latter could be due to distinctive characteristics of the service sector in general that 
make it more vulnerable to fluctuations in the exchange rate. Reasons for these findings could 
include an infrequent use of indirect hedging, with fewer inputs needed in the production 
process of services than of goods and/or more restricted access to financial hedging due to a 
lack of assets. Furthermore, more severe transportation obstacles increase the probability of 
exporting indirectly, though this is true for firms in the goods sector only. A likely 
explanation for this is that services are frequently non-tradable goods that often need to be 
provided close to where the customer is based, and are therefore not affected by obstacles 
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related to the transportation of goods, supplies and inputs. From the firm’s perspective, these 
obstacles do increase the fixed costs of exporting and thereby affect their decision to export 
but since indirect exporters do not have to deal directly with the transportation of goods, they 
do not have to perceive transportation as a serious obstacle.  
Table 7. Probit Results - Goods versus Services exports  
Manufacturing firms Services except retailers and wholesalers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. 
Variable: indirect indirect indirect Indirect 
Ind. 
Variables: 
Ln N Em-
ployees 0.00395 0.00571 -0.0188** -0.0185** 
(0.00696) (0.00674) (0.00905) (0.00907) 
Ln Labour 
Productivity -0.0160** -0.0273*** 0.0110 0.00954 
(0.00637) (0.00773) (0.00929) (0.0104) 
Export Inten-
sity -0.00574*** -0.00567*** -0.00481*** -0.00484*** 
(0.000374) (0.000384) (0.000339) (0.000342) 
Foreign -0.0228 -0.0267 0.0552** 0.0589** 
(0.0197) (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0252) 
Transport 0.00840* 0.00679 0.00913 0.00734 
(0.00526) (0.00547) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
Customs 0.0794** 0.0930*** 
(0.0324) (0.0321) 
Crime 0.0205*** 0.0196** -0.00381 -0.00511 
(0.00794) (0.00801) (0.0114) (0.0119) 
Permits 0.0289** 0.0289** 
(0.0132) (0.0134) 
Legal System -0.0141 -0.0122 -0.0142 -0.0154 
(0.00970) (0.00909) (0.0142) (0.0144) 
EU -0.0760** -0.0767** -0.0583* -0.0450 
(0.0335) (0.0342) (0.0329) (0.0344) 
CEFTA -0.0643* -0.0609* -0.0231 -0.0297 
(0.0388) (0.0370) (0.0505) (0.0491) 
Voleuro -0.221* 0.691*** 
(0.117) (0.173) 
Vol EER -0.616** 1.338*** 
(0.243) (0.491) 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.189 0.227 0.226 0.222 
Observations 3086 3011 1084 1069 
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Notes: Reported values are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables; Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country and industry level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include 
country dummies and industry and year dummies, not reported to save space. The dependent variable is binary 
(0,1) and takes the value of one when a firm exports indirectly (broad definition: indirect exporters only + 
exporters with a mixed exporting strategy). Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from the regressions. 
 
Table 8. Fractional probit Results - Goods versus Services exports  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Manufacturing firms 
 
Services except retailers and wholesalers 
Dep.variable: indirectshare indirectshare indirectshare Indirectshare 
 Ind. Variables:         
Ln N Employees -0.000279 0.000590 -0.00852*** -0.00846*** 
(0.00248) (0.00251) (0.00296) (0.00298) 
Ln Labour Produc-
tivity -0.00872*** -0.0143*** 0.000400 -0.000649 
(0.00286) (0.00320) (0.00399) (0.00430) 
Foreign  -0.00773 -0.00910 0.0264* 0.0290** 
(0.00828) (0.00829) (0.0138) (0.0143) 
Export Intensity -0.00459*** -0.00451*** -0.00379*** -0.00383*** 
(0.000190) (0.000189) (0.000351) (0.000343) 
Transport -4.22e-05 -0.000573 0.00362 0.00272 
(0.00306) (0.00308) (0.00456) (0.00464) 
Crime 0.00939*** 0.00888*** -0.00201 -0.00283 
(0.00315) (0.00317) (0.00435) (0.00443) 
Legal System -0.00486 -0.00452 -0.00503 -0.00589 
(0.00383) (0.00387) (0.00553) (0.00562) 
EU -0.0415** -0.0409** -0.0204 -0.0136 
(0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0195) 
CEFTA -0.0228 -0.0214 -0.00409 -0.00629 
(0.0193) (0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0219) 
Customs 0.0327* 0.0418** 
(0.0185) (0.0197) 
Permits 0.0100** 0.0102** 
(0.00464) (0.00467) 
Voleuro -0.0277 0.260** 
(0.109) (0.104) 
Vol EER -0.122 0.502** 
(0.229) (0.243) 
Observations 3,086 3,011 1,087 1,071 
Pseudo R-squared 0.309 0.308 0.346 0.345 
Notes: Reported values are marginal effects at the mean of the independent variables; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include country dummies and industry and year 
dummies, not reported to save space. Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from the regressions. 
 
3.2 Robustness 
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As a first robustness check we estimated a Heckman-Probit and a fractional regression with 
correction for selection bias. The Heckman-Probit involves two equations that use the 
probability of exporting or not and the probability of exporting indirectly, respectively, as 
dependent variables, and the second stage uses the share of indirect exports.  
Table A.4 shows in columns (1) and (2) the first and second step from the Heckman-Probit 
and in column (3) the fractional Probit second step results. A Wald test of independence of 
equations (1) and (2) indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence 
between the decision to export and the decision to export indirectly. Moreover, the Mills ratio 
in the second step regression is not statistically significant, indicating that the intensity of 
indirect exporting is independent from the decision of how to export. Concerning the reported 
estimates, in general the sign of variation is similar as in Tables 5 and 6, but most estimates 
lose precision. 
Results in column (2) indicate that while a higher number of employees, labour productivity 
and foreign ownership lead to an increase in a firm’s probability of exporting, a more acute 
perception of crime and customs as obstacles decreases the probability of exporting and 
increases the share of intermediated exports. As previously explained, we exclude the 
variable corruption from the Probit in column (1) to fulfil the exclusion restriction. 
EU membership, but not CEFTA membership, has a significant positive impact on the 
probability of exporting. EU and CEFTA membership, however, negatively affect the share of 
intermediated exports. The fact that the IMR from the Heckman-Probit is not significant in 
the second stage suggests that there is no evidence of a selection bias coming from the 
decision on the export mode.  
As a second robustness check we use the narrow definition of indirect exports and estimate 
the same models as in the previous section in Table 5. The results are presented in Table A.5, 
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which includes probit estimations in columns (1) to (3). The main difference found compared 
to the previous results is that the exchange rate volatility variable is now statistically 
significant, indicating that higher levels of volatility increase a firm’s probability of exporting 
indirectly only. Firm size and labour productivity are also now statistically significant; 
smaller and less productive firms are more likely to export only indirectly than to pursue a 
mixed exporting strategy or export only directly. Also, foreign ownership decreases the 
probability of selecting the indirect-only exporting strategy. Comparing the variables 
transportation and crime with the previous results, only the second stays statistically 
significant. Hence, transportation of goods, supplies and inputs does not seem to increase the 
likelihood of exporting only indirectly. The main drawback of using this definition is the low 
number of firms that only export indirectly, around 700, which makes unfeasible a separate 
analysis for goods and services. 
4 Conclusions 
Although it is by its very nature vague, uncertainty, measured as the perceived severity of 
obstacles, appears to play an important role in explaining a firm’s choice between direct and 
indirect exporting. It also seems to have a different impact on goods and services. 
Firms that are smaller, less productive and that export a lower share of their production prefer 
indirect exporting over direct exporting, while uncertainty in different fields makes the use of 
intermediaries increasingly attractive to firms. In particular, the perception of potential threats 
such as criminality and problems with customs and transport infrastructure has a significant 
impact on the mode of export, favouring indirect exporting versus direct exporting. 
Furthermore, we show that uncertainty about future revenues due to volatility in the domestic 
exchange rate favours indirect exporting and increases the share of indirect exports over total 
exports of services, but decreases that of goods. We were also able to show that the main 
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results are not driven by sample selection bias, and the inclusion of various controls confirms 
their robustness. 
A limitation of the paper is that the lack of panel data does not allow us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we are assuming that unobserved factors that are firm-
specific are not correlated with the target variables used as proxies for business obstacles. 
Finally, our findings highlight the importance of intermediaries in countries where firms 
perceive challenges in the business environment that affect the level of uncertainty and thus 
the fixed costs of exporting. Reducing perceived uncertainty as well as improving conditions 
for intermediaries would help domestic firms with their exporting activities. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A.1. Variables description 
Note: The subscripts i, j, k, t denote firm, country, sector and year, respectively. *Firms responded to the question: What 
percentage of establishment sales were: national sales, indirect exports (sales through a third party); direct exports?” 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Description Range 
Dependent variable 
Indirectexportsijkt Share of indirect exports over total exports* 0-100 
Firm characteristics 
ln Employeesijkt Natural logarithm of the number of permanent full-time 
workers 
0-10.54 
ln LaborProdijkt Natural logarithm of sales divided by the number of workers 1.56-26.84 
Exportintensityijkt Share of exported sales 1-100 
Foreignijkt =1 if part of the firm is owned by foreign private individuals 0,  1 
Transportationijkt Perception of transportation of goods, supplies and inputs as 
an obstacle 
0=no obstacle - 4=very severe 
Customsijkt Perception of customs and trade regulation as an obstacle 0=no-moderate obstacle - 1=Major 
or very severe obstacle 
Crimeijkt Perception of crime, theft and disorder as an obstacle 0=no obstacle - 4=very severe 
Legalsystemijkt Perception of the court system as fair, impartial and not cor-
rupt (Alternative measure: Perception of courts as an obsta-
cle for the current operations of the firm) 
1=agree - 4=strongly disagree 
(0=no obstacle - 4=very severe) 
Permitsijkt Perception of business permits and licences as an obstacle 0=no obstacle - 4=very severe 
Customstimeijkt Av. number days it took for exported goods to clear customs 1=1 or fewer - 5=more than 20 
Country variables 
EUjt =1 if country j was a member of the EU in year t 0 , 1 
CEFTAjt =1 if country j was a member of the CEFTA in year t 0 , 1 
VolatilityEurojt-1 
Measure of volatility in the exchange rate of j and the euro in 
t-1 0-0.47 
VolatilityEER jt-1 
Measure of volatility in the nominal effective exchange rate 
of j and 138 countries in t-1 0.002-0.196 
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Table A.2 Share of firms in each sector by export status 
code Sector 
Non-
exporter 
Indirect 
only 
Ind  and  
Direct 
Direct 
only Total 
2 Other manufacturing 59.1 5.6 6.5 28.7 
1,651 
15 Food 64.5 4.2 4.4 26.9 3,771 
17 Textiles 47.6 8.6 5.0 38.8 361 
18 Garments 59.9 6.5 5.1 28.5 1,200 
24 Chemicals 49.4 6.1 6.7 37.7 342 
25 Plastics  and  rubber 52.8 5.2 9.3 32.7 248 
26 Non metallic minerals 65.1 2.3 4.7 27.9 344 
27 Basic metals 48.6 4.9 7.0 39.4 142 
28 Fabricated metal prod. 57.2 4.8 6.1 31.9 1,174 
29 Machinery and equipment 47.6 5.7 7.6 39.1 955 
31 Electronics (31  and  32) 48.7 5.6 5.6 40.1 197 
  Manufacturing 58.9 5.1 5.6 30.4 10385 
45 Construction Section 89.5 1.2 0.9 8.5 2,693 
50 Other services 84.2 1.5 1.4 12.9 2,779 
51 Wholesale 78.1 3.0 2.4 16.6 3,488 
52 Retail 91.7 1.5 1.1 5.7 4,179 
55 Hotel and restaurants 86.4 2.7 2.3 8.6 1,318 
60 Transport  Section  60.2 5.2 5.9 28.6 1,682 
72 IT 62.2 1.9 2.2 33.8 370 
  Services 82.9 2.2 2.0 12.9 16,509 
  Total 73.6 3.4 3.4 19.6 26,894 
Note: Last column reports number of firms per sector, the rest report percentages.  
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Table A.3 Number of firms by country and sector 
Sector: 
Country:      2 15 17 18 24 25 26 27 28 29 45 50 51 52 55 60 72 
      
Total 
Albania 31 88 33 11 9 6 14 10 23 1 74 68 119 88 88 67 1 733
Armenia 65 215 8 28 15 8 17 7 34 13 53 61 73 164 68 48 15 896
Azerbaijan 36 185 43 3 9 6 17 29 6 43 93 65 111 159 36 43 6 900
Belarus 50 63 11 18 11 11 12 1 17 7 168 83 150 149 16 69 12 848
Bosnia 80 108 6 9 4 12 5 3 28 13 70 47 134 130 46 43 2 743
Bulgaria 76 233 24 163 48 27 19 1 76 108 82 115 190 292 72 86 167 1,854
Croatia 85 181 33 56 7 18 17 2 126 26 99 82 149 163 46 46 10 1,162
Czech 
Republic 54 93 4 4 9 15 9 10 27 31 109 123 104 117 60 72 12 862
Estonia 65 47 5 14 2 4 7 1 13 7 85 94 71 123 63 51 7 662
FYROM 44 94 7 36 6 2 9 6 16 5 72 44 147 135 48 54 6 736
Georgia 47 109 3 4 3 6 17 11 7 3 75 96 79 168 57 60 2 747
Hungary 61 132 8 58 6 13 9 7 149 85 107 122 153 120 47 54 13 1,151
Kazakhstan 84 273 6 82 5 10 19 2 42 71 170 119 156 226 37 61 7 1,380
Kyrgyz 46 110 17 3 4 6 10 4 3 7 75 71 89 82 25 51 2 610
Latvia 58 53 6 12 0 1 5 2 8 6 53 90 124 152 28 50 3 652
Lithuania 66 65 14 13 1 6 6 0 7 11 87 63 81 114 63 72 5 682
Moldova 36 212 2 47 5 2 7 0 48 5 53 76 115 194 29 55 0 887
Montenegro 13 24 1 0 2 0 1 0 5 1 7 6 24 47 12 10 1 154
Poland 73 227 15 162 6 20 23 4 184 82 212 189 273 242 50 144 19 1,930
Romania 69 227 12 119 16 10 10 7 110 67 111 134 121 235 55 78 9 1,396
Russia 152 302 17 126 103 22 27 12 100 121 225 256 245 215 54 103 10 2,114
Serbia 67 108 17 9 14 12 8 4 30 13 82 121 148 135 50 67 9 900
Slovakia 30 46 5 6 9 4 5 4 23 23 69 135 97 106 44 42 13 665
Slovenia 34 59 11 4 7 13 10 3 33 30 94 107 88 90 42 47 11 687
Tajikistan 37 102 25 18 6 3 22 2 5 8 99 84 104 127 35 52 1 736
Ukraine 156 310 14 179 18 6 18 6 47 146 154 248 212 204 84 82 20 1,908
Uzbekistan 36 105 14 16 17 5 21 4 7 22 115 80 131 202 63 75 7 926
Total in 1000 1.7 3.8 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.2 1 2.7 2.8 3.5 4.2 1.3 1.7 0.4 26.697
Notes: Sectors 45-72 are services. Sectors 51 and 52 are, respectively, wholesalers and retailers.  
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Table A.4. Heckman-Probit model and second-step fractional probit 
Heckman Probit  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Dep. Var: 
Probit_indirect 
 
Probit_exporting 
Select (export) 
Fractional Probit 
Indirect share 
 Ind. Variables:      
Ln N Employees -0.0908 0.264*** -0.00184 
(0.0759) (0.00974) (0.00671) 
Ln Labour Productivity -0.0311 0.0772*** 0.00186 
(0.0277) (0.0112) (0.00347) 
Foreign  -0.316** 0.647*** -0.0348 
(0.159) (0.0392) (0.0243) 
Customs 0.362** -0.488*** 0.0119* 
(0.147) (0.0551) (0.00650) 
Transport 0.0341 0.0166 0.00365 
(0.0262) (0.0133) (0.0364) 
Crime 0.0551** -0.0664*** 0.00853 
(0.0247) (0.0139) (0.00674) 
Corruption 0.0423***  
(0.0123)  
Legal System -0.0624** 0.0147 0.000715 
(0.0283) (0.0161) (0.00626) 
EU -0.138 0.144** -0.0226* 
(0.126) (0.0693) (0.0120) 
CEFTA -0.161 0.0276 -0.0283** 
(0.131) (0.0794) (0.0139) 
Voleuro -0.366 -0.839* -0.0806 
(1.036) (0.478) (0.159) 
IMR   -0.0204 
(0.052) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.255  
Observations 12,173 12,173 4056 
Censored Observations 8618  
Rho -0.541 -0.541  
Probability 0.225 0.225  
Note: Reported values are marginal effect at the mean values of the independent variables; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IMR denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman-Probit main 
equation. Rho is a Wald test of independent equations in the Heckman-Probit model and the associated probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of independence is reported in the last row of the table. 
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Table A.5. Narrow definition of indirect exports  
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Probit Probit Probit 
 Dep var.: Indirect export dummy  
  
Ind. Var: 
Ln N Employ-
ees -0.0159*** -0.0161*** -0.0166*** 
(0.00332) (0.00330) (0.00360) 
Ln labour 
Productivity -0.00867* -0.00863* -0.0136*** 
(0.00460) (0.00461) (0.00482) 
Export Intensity -0.000692*** -0.000674*** -0.000648*** 
(0.000238) (0.000236) (0.000249) 
Foreign -0.0372*** -0.0346*** -0.0353*** 
(0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0118) 
Transport 0.00172 0.00146 0.00214 
(0.00474) (0.00481) (0.00508) 
Customs 0.0276 0.0317 0.0377 
(0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0265) 
Crime 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.00902** 
(0.00346) (0.00362) (0.00382) 
Legal System -0.00230 -0.00212 -0.000733 
(0.00460) (0.00452) (0.00447) 
EU -0.0702*** -0.0731*** -0.0725*** 
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0187) 
CEFTA -0.0185 -0.00673 -0.0122 
(0.0227) (0.0237) (0.0230) 
Voleuro 0.310*** 
(0.114) 
Vol EER 0.556** 
(0.245) 
Observations 4,233 4,178 4,024 
R-squared 0.0898 0.0920 0.0878 
Pseudo R2 -0.0159*** -0.0161*** -0.0166*** 
Notes: Reported values are marginal effects of the independent variables; Robust standard errors clustered at the 
country and industry level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include country dummies and 
industry and year dummies, not reported to save space. The dependent variable is binary (0,1) and takes the value of one 
when a firm exports indirectly (narrow definition: indirect exporters only). Retailers and wholesalers are excluded from 
the regressions. 
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Figure A.1 Labour productivity distribution for direct and indirect exporters and non-exporters, 
whole sample 
 
Note: Green colour denotes non-exporters, red denotes indirect exporters and blue direct exporters. Labour productivity 
is calculated by dividing total annual sales in the last fiscal year by number of permanent, full-time employees of the 
firm at the end of the last fiscal year. Broad definition of indirect exporters has been used. When using the narrow 
definition, the overlap between indirect exporters and direct exporters is more notorious. 
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